Airplanes in the Admiralty Jurisdiction: A Short History by Crenshaw, D. K.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 18 Issue 4 Article 2 
1966 
Airplanes in the Admiralty Jurisdiction: A Short History 
D. K. Crenshaw 
Young, Clement & Rivers (Charleston, SC) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
D. Kerry Crenshaw, Airplanes in the Admiralty Jurisdiction: A Short History, 18 S. C. L. Rev. 572 (1966). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
AIRPLANES IN THE ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION:
A SHORT HISTORY
D. K miy CiSmDEAW*
With the advent of the airplane as a convenient mode of inter-
continental transportation, an inevitable question arose: must
the admiralty give up a measure of its salty tradition and allow
these ships of the air into its sacred integuments?. When air-
planes began to be used often enough to raise this question, there
were those' who boldly contended that these craft were compre-
hended within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States.2 They were bitterly opposed by a segment of the
common law bar, and in 1921 the matter came into the open at a
meeting of the American Bar Association when the "Special
Committee on the Law of Aviation" urged a constitutional
amendment to bring all aviation under federal control.3 President
Harding had sent a bill to Congress on April 19, 1921, proposing
that this control be under the admiralty jurisdiction.4 The special
committee attacked the bill, and it went down under withering
fire." In later years similar attempts at omnibus aviation liability
legislation, though not always through the admiralty route, have
also been unsuccessful.
6
* LL.B., 1965, Duke University; associate, Young, Clement & Rivers, Charles-
ton, S. C., 1965-66; on active duty, U. S. Army, 1966-68.
1. Conference of Delegates from State and Local Bar Ass'ns at Boston,
Sept. 2, 1919. See Knauth, Aviation and Admiralty, 6 Am L. Rav. 226 (1935).
2. U. S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
3. 46 A.B.A. REP. 498 (1921).
4. H.R. 17, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921).
5. "It declares such portions of the air as are navigable by aircraft and all
aircraft navigating the air to be within the admiralty jurisdiction of the
federal courts (thus apparently claiming by Congressional action the
power to establish a jurisdiction which was constitutionally conferred).
... It extends the maritime law and laws relating to watercraft and
water navigation to aircraft and air navigation so far as applicable (thus
creating a fruitful field for controversial litigation and a degree of legal
uncertainty until after an event), and except (among other exceptions)
as modified by the rules and regulations (thus apparently conferring or
attempting to confer upon an administrative officer the power to modify
a law). It contemplates its own partial invalidity by saving the parts not
held to be invalid."
46 A.B.A. REP. 498, 524-25 (1921). See Knauth, Aviation and Admiralty, 6
AIR L. REv. 226, 229 (1935).
6. Most notable of these was the so-called "Sweeney Report" by the CAB
in 1941, which is discussed in Note, 12 Am L. Rav. 383 (1941). See also Keuhnl,
Uniform State Aviation Liability Legislation, 1948 Wis. L. Rv. 356, 360-61;
Orr, The Proposed State Uniform Aviation Liability Act, 1948-49 Paoc. ABA
SEc. or INs. L. 144. Other sequels include: Sweeney, Is Special Aviation Lia-
bility Legislation Essential? 19 J. Am L. 166, 317 (1952); Morris, Constitu-
tional and Procedural Problems Presented by Proposals in Congress on Tort
Liability in Air Transportation, 1947 INs. CouNsEL J. 22; and Buhler, Limita-
tion of Air Carrier's Tort Liability and Related Insurance Coverage: A Pro-
posed Federal Air Passenger Liability Act, 11 Am L. Rav. 262 (1940).
572
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A. Application of Traditional Admiralty Doctrine8 to Airplanes
The entire body of maritime law as it existed in 1921 was ob-
viously inapposite to the needs of aviation. While Congress was
not willing to extend the whole corpus of admiralty law to air-
planes, not all the courts were convinced that various admiralty
doctrines should not be applied piecemeal to airplanes coming
within the maritime nexus. In this same year a seaplane moored
in the navigable waters of New York Harbor dragged anchor
and drifted toward the beach. The libelant waded into the water
to turn the plane about and was struck by one of the propellers.
In typical literary flourish Mr. Justice Cardozo observed that
the latest of man's devices for locomotion had invaded the
navigable water, "the most ancient of his highways." This new
craft "would have mystified the Lord High Admiral in the day
when he was competing for jurisdiction with Coke and the courts
of common law."8 Nonetheless, it was held that while afloat the
new craft is subject to admiralty jurisdiction. This language
has not been extended beyond the seaplane situation, and in that
context it has been limited almost to the facts of that case. Where
a seaplane was removed from its hangar and its engine removed
for repairs, no admiralty lien was held to attach.9 Where a sea-
plane crashed into navigable waters, it was held that no maritime
lien for salvage attached, 10 although one case held that there
was admiralty jurisdiction for salvage where the seaplane buzzed
a ship and then landed on the water.":
It has been suggested that the courts should allow a salvage
lien regardless of the type of aircraft or whether it crashed or
"landed." 12 This is probably a good rule, but the suggestion has
not been taken to mean that maritime liens other than for salvage
attach to any sort of airplane.18 When a British court held that
seaplanes did not come within the maritime jurisdiction for pur-
poses of salvage,14 Parliament immediately passed the Air Navi-
7. Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service, 232 N.Y. 115, 133 N.E. 371 (1921).
8. Id. at 117, 133 N.E. at 371-72.
9. United States v. Northwest Air Serv., Inc., 80 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1935).
10. Foss v. Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215 Fed. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1914).
11. Lambros Seaplane Base v. The Batory, 215 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1954). In
this case admiralty jurisdiction was extended, but for other reasons the court
held that the salvors were not entitled to an award. The case is, then, not a
square holding that salvage liens will attach even to seaplanes.
12. Giu~oRE & BLAcK, Tnn- LAW OF ADMIRALTY 450 (1957).
13. Comment, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 1084, 1089 (1964).
14. Watson v. R.C.A. Victor Co., 50 Lloyd's L.R. 77 (1934), 1935 A.M.C.
1251.
1966]
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gation Act of 193615 which made salvage applicable to airplanes
on the high seas. In view of the shaky state of the law in the
United States as to jurisdiction in salvage lien cases, a compar-
able statute for the United States might not be a bad idea. This
is one of the few instances where the airplane is in exactly the
same position as a ship liable for salvage, since the plane is
either floating helplessly on the sea or has sunk, and in either
event its capacity for flight no longer exists. The factors which
distinguish ships from airplanes in other contexts are no longer
relevant for salvage liens, and jurisdiction should attach.
While no conceptual obstacles of a serious nature are encoun-
tered in making the maritime law of salvage applicable to air-
planes, there are serious ones when attempts are made to apply
limitation of liability. The Limitation Act' was passed osten-
sibly to help American shipowners compete with the British mer-
chant marine.17 Congress has evinced no such unusual solicita-
tion for the competitive viability of the airlines; or if it has, it
has limited its preferences to mail contracts' I and airport con-
struction. 10 Moreover, the Limitation Act is worded in terms of
"vessels," which makes it easy for a court to hold that an airplane
is not a vessel.2 0 The cases in which a right to limitation has
been asserted, however, have chosen not to rely on this make-
weight argument, but have gone right to the heart of the
matter and looked at the purpose in applying the Limitation Act
to airplanes. In Noakes v. Impenia Airways2 ' a plane fell into
the sea, broke up and sank. The court denied limitation, holding
that the primary purpose of the plane was flight through air,
and it was incapable of being used as a means of transportation
by water. Where a seaplane crashed into the Caribbean, limita-
15. 10 & 11 GEo. V, CH. 80 (1936), 1937 U.S. Av. 415. For the exotic state of
the law prior to the Watson case, see Flotsam and Jetsam, Findall and Waifs
(Not to Mention Ligan or Lagan), 122 JusT. P. 570, 571 (1958).
16. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1964).
17. See 23 CoNG. GLoBE 331-32, 713-20, 776-77, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 25,
Feb. 26, Mar. 3, 1851), for the brief Senate debate; see also, GramoRE & BLAcic,
THE LAw or ADmIALTY 663-67 (1957).
18. 49 U.S.C. § 1376 (1964).
19. 49 U.S.C. § 1104 (1964).
20. "Except as specifically provided in sections 143-147d of Title 33, the navi-
gation and shipping laws of the United States, including any definition of'vessel' or 'vehicle' found therein and including the rules for the prevention
of collisions, shall not be construed to apply to seaplanes or other aircraft
or to the navigation of vessels in relation to seaplanes or other aircraft."
49 U.S.C. § 1509(a).
21. 29 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
[Vol. 18
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tion was refused because the fundamental purpose of the Limi-
tation Act was to build up the Merchant Marine, and since water
navigation for a seaplane was purely an auxiliary function, it
was held not to come within the purpose of the Limitation Act.
22
Thus, limitation would not appear to be applicable to airplanes
at all. If there can be no limitation for seaplanes, then a fortiori
there should never be any for aircraft which in their normal
operation do not touch the sea.
Even if the airlines cannot take advantage of this traditional
maritime doctrine, there still remains their own peculiar limita-
tion device, the Warsaw Convention. 28 Most of the flights over
water are international, and where an action arises between sig-
natories to the treaty,24 airlines can obtain the benefit of its
passenger recovery limitation which is about $8,300 per death.25
This treaty limitation, combined with the traditional res ipsa
loguitur theory, has been denominated by one critic as a "slot
machine" award of the liability limits.2 6
The rule of divided damages in collisions of mutual fault was
frozen into admiralty law in The Schooner hazthmiane 'V. Dick-
inson.27 While this limitation has been criticized by both judges
and commentators,2 8 no court has attempted to overrule it, and
as yet Congress has not been willing to offend the cargo inter-
ests by expanding this doctrine.2 9 The doctrine today is just as
vital as ever in its application to ships. 30 But what about air-
22. Dollins v. Pan-American Grace Airways, 27 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y.
1939).
23. 49 Stat. 3000 (October 12, 1929) ; T.S. No. 876.
24. Seventy-four nations are signatories to this convention. See U. S. Dept.
of State, Office of Legal Advisor, Treaties in Force (1964).
25. The text ratified by the United States is in French, and the limitation is
expressed as 125,000 francs. Warsaw Convention, Art. 22. The United States
has announced it may withdraw if the limits are not raised temporarily to
$75,000 and eventually to $100,000. See TmE MAGAZIm 86:98, Oct. 28, 1965.
26. Prominski, Wrongful Death in Aviation: State, Federal, and Warsaw,
15 U. MIner L. Rzv. 59, 73 (1960). See generally SnEasAx, THE SocrAL IM-
PACT OF THE WARSAW CONVENTON (1952), and Rittenberg, Limitation of Air-
line Passenger Liability, 6 J. AiR L. & Comm. 365 (1935).
27. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 177-78 (1855). Here, the court held that "under
the circumstances usually attending these disasters, we think the rule dividing
the loss the most just and equitable, and as best tending to induce care and
vigilance on both sides, in navigation." The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson,
supra at 177-78.
28. GiLmoRE & BLACAK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 441-42 (1957).
29. See Knauth, Aviation and Admiralty, 6 AiR L. REv. 226, 232-33 (1935).
30. In Weyerheuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597 (1963) the
Supreme Court held that the rule was not qualified to exclude from division
F.E.C.A. payments to an injured seaman.
1966]
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planes? One writer early suggested that when a plane crash
occurs on or close to the water with mutual fault, the admiralty
rule of half-damages should be applied. He acknowledged that
there would be no basis for applying the doctrine "when the
collision takes place in the navigable airspaces."31 No case has
yet been reported where the application of this rule has been
sought. This is not without good reason, either, since an adverse
decision on this mutual fault theory would leave both airlines
completely open to proof of negligence by all passengers to whom
they would have admitted fault. Apparently, the airlines feel
that as things stand they have at least a fighting chance under
the res ipsa loguitur approach, 2 and the divided damages route
would be too risky.
"General Average" is another maritime doctrine that has not
been invoked by an airline, and this is as it should be. There is
little reason why such losses could not be handled by insurance.
Moreover, there is almost no maritime connection except for the
falling of cargo into the sea, and if such a doctrine were applied
to aircraft, admiralty jurisdiction would be extended to airplanes
merely to shift the burden of insurance from the carrier to the
shipper, hardly an adequate justification for such an extension.
B. Tort Liability
By far the most prolific source of litigation over airplanes and
admiralty jurisdiction has taken place in the area of tort liability.
The airlines have been remarkably successful in placing them-
selves within this jurisdiction. One reason for this success is the
confusion of the courts as to what the admiralty jurisdiction is,
even as applied to ships.83 In 1957 the touchstone for successful
invocation of admiralty jurisdiction was stated to be the magic
word "vessel," and "an airplane is generally held not to be a
vessel."3 4 The foundations of authority for that statement were
31. Knauth, Aviation and Admiralty, 6 AiR L. Rxv. 226, 233 (1935).
32. See, e.g., I-Iaasman v. Pacific Alaska Air Express, 100 F. Supp. 1 (D.
Alaska 1951), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Des Marais v. Beckman, 198 F.2d 550
(1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 922 (1953). See also Goldin, The Doctrine of
Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation Law, 18 So. CAL. L. REv. 15, 124 (1944);
McLarty, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Airline Passenger Litigation, 37 VA. L. Rv.
55 (1951); Void, Strict Liability for Aircraft Crashes and Forced Landings
on Ground Victims Outside Established Landing Areas, 5 HASTINGS LJ. 1
(1953) ; Prominski, Wrongful Death in Aviation: State, Federal and Warsaw,
15 U. MiAmi L. REv. 59 (1960).
33. See Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: The Devil's Own Mess, 1960
Sup. CT. REv. 158, for a discussion of the cases.
34. Gummom & BLAcK, THE LAW or AummALY 29-30 (1957).
[V7ol. is
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two district court cases 5 and the Air Commerce Act of 1926,86
which had long been held inapposite to wrongful death claims
from airplane deaths in admiralty.3 7 The difficulties of capsulat-
ing the extent of admiralty jurisdiction for beginning students
in admiralty law indeed must have been great, and this over-
conceptualistic generalization can perhaps be partially justified
on this basis for as the Supreme Court once stated, "the precise
scope of admiralty jurisdiction is not a matter of obvious prin-
ciple or of very accurate history.18 8 Such traditional thinking
on the part of the admiralty bar could be financially costly,80
as well as downright fraudulent to personal injury and death
clients seeking a remedy.
The problem originated with the Death on the High Seas
Act40 which, while not worded in terms of "vessels," gave a cause
of action previously existing only under the laws of the states,
"whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful
act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a
marine league from the shore of any State, or the District of
Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United
States .. ."41
Thus, prior cases construed statutes whose jurisdiction was
conferred in terms of "vessels" 42 and would not appear to be
35. Noakes v. Imperial Airways, 29 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) and U. S.
v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950). The latter case involved a fact
situation too interesting to pass over. There, the passengers were returning
from the Caribbean, and had imbibed considerable quantities of that area's most
notable product. Suddenly, the pilot noticed that the nose of the plane was
rising so fast that the automatic pilot could not compensate. Upon inquiry he
discovered a round of fisticuffs among the passengers in the tail section, and
everyone had crowded aft to watch. The captain was able to break up the melee
only after sustaining serious injury from being bitten on the shoulder by one
of the participants, who was described as having gone berserk. The issue was
whether admiralty took jurisdiction over criminal assaults in planes over navi-
gable waters, and the court concluded that it did not.
36. 49 U.S.C. § 1509(a) (1964).
37. Choy v. Pan Am. Airways Co., 1941 A.M.C. 483 (S.D.N.Y.); Higa v.
Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 13 (D Hawaii 1954), aff'd, 230 F2d 780
(9th Cir. 1955) ; Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Calif.
1954).
38. The Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361, 365 (1904).
39. Recoveries for actions against airlines are generally among the largest
reported in each issue of the NACCA Law Journal's section on "Verdicts or
Awards Exceeding $50,000."
40. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1964).
41. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1964).
42. Such a statute was the Criminal Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. § 7(1)
(1964), which created admiralty criminal jurisdiction to cover the void left by
U.S. v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
1966]
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binding upon the jurisdictional scope of the High Seas Act. It
was early decided that collisions taking place under the high
seas were within the contemplated jurisdiction of this act.43
However, this decision was not generally regarded as authority
for the proposition that admiralty had vertical-plane jurisdiction
over navigable waters. In fact nobody gave much thought at all
to the airplane jurisdiction of admiralty, and when the first air-
plane case was brought under the High Seas Act, it concerned a
seaplane, that same hybrid invention that had so confused the
law of admiralty jurisdiction in Reinhardt v. Newport Flying
Serv.44 The action was brought on the civil docket, and the de-
fendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The defendant
contended that the action had been in the civil court rather than
in admiralty, and the High Seas Act granted a right to sue only
"in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty. .... 545
The court held that the words "in admiralty" had been inserted
because of the doubt then existing as to whether legislation aug-
menting seamen's rights to recover damages for personal injury
and granting common law jurisdiction to hear cases under it,
might not be an unwarranted invasion of the admiralty jurisdic-
tion. It concluded that this question had been settled favorably
since the Act was passed, and thus the action could be brought
at common law.48 Two years later an action in a state court in-
volving a plane lost over the Pacific Ocean was sustained under
this same statute.
47
The question of whether admiralty jurisdiction was exclusive
as to actions brought under the High Seas Act for death on ships
on the high seas was settled in favor of exclusiveness in 1952.
4 8
43. The City of Rome, 48 F2d 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (A merchant vessel had
collided with a submarine, killing 32 persons aboard the submarine.)
44. 322 N.Y. 115, 133 N.E. 371 (1921). See, Choy v. Pan Am. Airways Co.,
1941 A.M.C. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
45. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1964)
46. Choy v. Pan Am. Airways Co., 1941 A.M.C. 483, 487. The court be-
lieved that this question had been settled by Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264
U.S. 375 (1924), reasoning that since the Death on the High Seas Act and the
Jones Act were enacted by the same Congress, it would be anomalous to hold
that seamen had a common law action for death and other victims of injuries
on the same ship had not. Choy v. Pan Am. Airways Co., .supra at 486.
47. Wyman v. Pan. Am. Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420
(1943), aff'd tmnm., 293 N.Y. 878, 59 N.E.2d 785 (1944), cert. dended, 324 U.S.
882 (1945).
48. Iafrate v. Compagnie Gen. Transatlantque, 106 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y.
1952). The court said that "to hold otherwise would mean that the references
made to actions and suits in admiralty... [in the Death on the High Seas
Act] . . . are surplusage." id. at 621.
[Vol. 18
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It was not long before the courts had an opportunity to extend
it to airplanes. In Wggon v. Transocean Airines49 there was a
plane crash approximately three hundred miles east of Wake
Island. The decedent had been a passenger on a flight from
Guam to Oakland, and his representative brought an action in
the California Superior Court. Removal was sought to the fed-
eral district court, alleging the jurisdictional amount and "aris-
ing under" the Death on the High Seas Act. In holding that the
action should have been brought in admiralty, the court observed
that the decision of the Supreme Court in Panama R.R. v. John-
soO 50 was an unreliable guide to interpreting the High Seas
Act.51 Likewise the Air Commerce Act of 1926,52 with its ex-
clusion of airplanes from "navigation and shipping laws," was
never intended to include a general admiralty statute such as the
Death on the High Seas Act. As to whether the Act must be
enforced exclusively in admiralty, it was stated that "the pro-
vision that enforcement is to be in admiralty is a limitation on
the right itself."53 Judge Goodman reasoned that the word "may"
is not used to designate a permissible forum but to grant a right
of action where none existed before, and the words "in ad-
miralty" are not mere surplusage. The courts will construe an
act to give meaning to every word. Since the plaintiff had al-
leged that the decedent was killed when the plane hit the water,
he did not find it necessary to go into the question of fact as to
where the death actually took place, but dismissed the civil com-
plaint without prejudice to filing a libel in admiralty.5 4
Higa v. Tramoecn Airlines 5 arose out of the same disaster,
and the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Wilson to hold that
"Congress has created a substantive admiralty right to be as-
serted solely in the federal courts in admiralty, by the plain
words of the High Seas Act that the administrator 'may main-
tain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United
States, in admiralty.' 56 Again it was stated that the disposition
of the case made it unnecessary to decide whether the High Seas
Act applied to airplanes, which were not in any way navigable
49. 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Calif. 1954).
50. 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
51. Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 96 (N.D. Calif. 1954).
52. Now, 49 U.S.C. § 15 09(a) (1964).
53. Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 94 (N.D. Calif. 1954).
54. Id. at 98.
55. 230 F2d 780 (9th Cir. 1955).
56. Higa v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F2d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1955).
1966]
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vessels.57 Unfortunately the plaintiff was not given leave to file
a libel in admiralty without prejudice to the statute of limitations
in this case, on the theory that he had been warned of the pos-
sibility of this holding and could have filed a suit in admiralty
without affecting his rights to appeal.58
The mystique created over the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction
was beginning now to be costly to a plaintiff or libelant who
happened to file on the wrong "side" of the federal court, or
who brought his action in a state court under the "saving to
suitors." The controversy was caused by the loose draftsmanship
of Congress and could have been cleared up easily by that body.
However, that was hardly a likely prospect in view of its peren-
nial hesitance to enact any sort of maritime legislation.59 Prior
to the enactment of the High Seas Act, the knotty choice of law
problems in applying state law when vessels were jointly owned
or mutually at fault would seem to justify enactment of the High
Seas Act.60 Further, there was the problem that states refused
to give extra-territorial effect to wrongful death statutes, either
by judicial construction 0' or by application of the conflicts rule
that the law of the place of injury governs tort recovery. How-
ever, most of the courts which allowed High Seas Act claims to
be brought as civil actions had involved themselves in nice little
semantic arguments and had ignored the crucial question of what
Congress had intended by section one of the act.6 2 During the
House debates on the act, an interesting colloquy occurred:
57. Id. at 786.
58. Ibid.
59. The pace of major admiralty acts has been about ten years apart, except
for the spate of legislation in 1920: Harter Act (1893), Liens on Vessels Act
(1910), Ship Mortgage Act (1920), Jones Act (1920), Suits in Admiralty Act
(1920), Death on the High Seas Act (1948), Federal Motorboat Act (1958).
This snail's pace has not been due to lack of need for such legislation, however,
or from lack of invitation by the courts in maritime matters. See, e.g., Benz v.
Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
60. See S. REP. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919); H.R. REP. No. 674,
66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919). This problem generally still exists within the one
marine league limitation of the High Seas Act. See Comment, 64 CoLuiz~. L.
Ray. 1084, 1096-99 (1964). But cf. Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316
F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
61. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Beadle, 1 Fed. Cas. 1138, No. 541 (C.C.D. Calif.
1879).
62. E.g., Sierra v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 319 (D.P.R.
1952); Batkiewicz v. Seas Shipping Co., 53 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y.- 1943);
Choy v. Pan Am. Airways, 1941 A.M.C. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Wyman v.
Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1943). Usually the
question is whether the word "may" in § 1 is a permissive word, and even if
permissive, whether it is further limited by the words "in admiralty."
[Vol. 18
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Mr. MOORE of Virginia . . . "The purpose of this bill,
as I understand it, is to give exclusive jurisdiction to the
admiralty where the accident occurs on the high seas."
Mr. VOLSTEAD . . . "That is it."
Mr. GOODYKOONTH . . . "Mr. Speaker, if this bill
becomes law, the jurisdiction of the admiralty and the State
courts will not be concurrent... [T]lhe provision.., was
wisely inserted by experienced lawyers, who thrashed the
matter out; and I have no doubt but that every word in that
paragraph has a very particular and precise bearing and was
designed to take care of an important legal situation."
63
If these statements are any litmus of congressional intent, then
Congress seems to have limited actions under the High Seas Act
to admiralty courts, notwithstanding that state courts under the
"saving to suitors" clause are entitled procedurally to enforce
admiralty and federally-created rights applicable to admiralty
(even where common law substantive rights have been fore-
closed) .64 The only cause of action created by the act is one to
be brought "in the district courts of the United States, in ad-
miralty," and this would appear to imply that there is no right
which can be enforced by state courts under the powers reserved
for them.
Since there was no action at common law for a death on the
high seas, jurisdiction must be co-extensive with the cause of
action created. In this respect both the Wilson and Higa cases
furthered the congressional intent that the High Seas Act be
applied exclusively by the admiralty courts in cases beyond one
marine league from shore. It was obvious that when the act was
presented and passed, Congress did not consider whether or not
it should apply to the land-based aircraft that so commonly trav-
erse the oceans today. When this question arose thirty-four years
after the act was passed in NoeZ v. Linea Aeropostal Venezo-
Zana,65 it was held that a civil suit could not be brought. A New
York to Caracas flight crashed thirty miles off the New Jersey
shore, and the plaintiff, who obviously wanted a jury trial, filed
a civil complaint alleging that the death took place when the
plane hit the water. The complaint was dismissed because it was
63. 59 CONG. REC. 4484, 4486 (1920).
64. Pope & Talbott, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Seas Shipping Co.
v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 88 (1946); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317
U.S. 239 (1942).
65. 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 907 (1957).
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not in admiralty. In interpreting the phrase, "may maintain a
suit .. . in admiralty," the court observed that the legislative
history was clear. "The permissive element relates solely to the
grant of the right and not to the forum. ... Thus, the survival
section refers to 'pendency in a court of admiralty,' and if suit
could be maintained in other forums, there would be no reason
to restrict the survival provision in this manner."68 However,
neither Wilson, Higa nor NoeZ determined what was sufficient
to bring an airplane within the admiralty jurisdiction. This
question was left for later admiralty cases.
(I. LocaZity v. Maritime Conneotion in Tort Cases
The controversy over maritime jurisdiction in tort cases had
its origin in The Plymouth, 7 where a ship anchored in the
Chicago River caught fire, and the fire spread to adjoining
houses on the land. The libel brought by the home owners was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in admiralty because "the
whole, or at least the substantial cause of action, arising out of
the wrong, must be complete within the locality upon which the
jurisdiction depends-on the high seas or navigable waters." 8
In 1948 the Admiralty Extension Act6 9 was passed to remedy
this ship-to-shore amphibious tort situation. It extended ad-
miralty jurisdiction to all injuries "caused by a vessel . .. not-
withstanding that such .damage or injury be done or consum-
mated on land."70 This act would appear to be inapposite to the
situation of an airplane crash in navigable waters, as an airplane
is not in the first place deemed to be a "vessel," and in the second
place the act was designed to clear up the law of collisions with
shore installations.71 Moreover, it has been argued that this act
should not even extend to personal injury cases involving ships,
let alone airplanes.7 2 However, there has been some indication
that the Supreme Court is willing to go quite a way to extend
66. Id. at 680.
67. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865).
68. Id. at 36.
69. 46 U.S.C. § 40 (1964).
70. Ibid.
71. See GiLmom & BLAcx, TE LAw oF ADMIRALTY 432-34 (1957), where
the inequitable situation in bridge collisions prior to the Act is discussed, along
with unusual cases of ship collisions with cars on flooded highways and pro-
truding ship collisions with other shore installations. However, these authors
have not considered the effect of this act on injuries sustained aboard airplanes
over navigable waters and consummated on land.
72. See Note, 60 MIcH. L. Riv. 208, 212-13 (1961).
[Vol. 18
11
Crenshaw: Airplanes in the Admiralty Jurisdiction: A Short History
Published by Scholar Commons,
1ouH CAnoLiNAn nE AIR AGE
admiralty jurisdiction to matters not strictly within the locality
testT8 Where a longshoreman was injured by slipping on some
beans on the dock, recovery was allowed for the unseaworthiness
of the ship in taking on unseaworthy containers from which the
beans had escaped. This decision may be rationalized as putting
the limits on the ship-to-shore tort situation,7 4 but for purposes
of deciding what is within the admiralty jurisdiction, it ignores
elementary consideration of the two traditional theories-that a
maritime connection is required for admiralty jurisdiction, and
that maritime jurisdiction may be extended solely because the
act in question either was initiated or consummated on navigable
waters. Perhaps the latter theory was assumed by the Court.
In the Wilson case, which involved an airplane crash on the
high seas, there was strong language in support of maritime
locality as a sole requirement for admiralty jurisdiction. "Local-
ity has remained the sole test of admiralty tort jurisdiction de-
spite re-occurring expressions of doubt whether the tort must
not also bear some relation to the operation of a vessel." 75 On
the other hand, when swimmers at public bathing beaches have
attempted to use the Wilson argument, the courts have not been
convinced that mere maritime locality is sufficient for exclusive
admiralty jurisdiction, as illustrated by Mcuire v. City of New
York.7 6 Even where a water skier is injured while being towed
by a boat on navigable waters, the courts have by no means
been anxious to declare that admiralty jurisdiction is sustained
by the mere maritime locale.7 7 However, these recreation cases
should not be determinative of admiralty jurisdiction for air-
planes crashing into navigable waters because the problem is
not the same.78 There is nothing to distinguish recreation in
navigable waters from recreation in non-navigable inland water
with regard to formulation of national maritime policy.7 9 An
airplane, however, is another matter. It is a machine whose op-
eration requires consummate skill, is subject to some extent to
73. Guiterrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963), rehearing
denied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963).
74. Id. at 210.
75. Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 92 (N.D. Calif. 1954).
76. 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
77. See, e.g., King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn 1963).
78. One writer has implied that they should be treated the same. See Note,
32 Gao. WAsH. L. Rnv. 635 (1964).
79. See Putnam, How the Federal Courts Were Given Admiralty Jurisdic-
tion, 10 CoaxmL L.Q. 460 (1925), and Black, Admiralty Jurisdi tion: Critique
and Suggestions, 50 COLUm. L. Rxv. 259 (1950).
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the vagaries of weather, and when it crashes in navigable waters,
is at least as helpless as a ship in the same situation to render
assistance to any of its crew or passengers. It traverses the high
seas in constant and vital commerce with the nations of the
world and between principal cities of this nation. To say that
it is not maritime is one thing, but to deny admiralty jurisdiction
on the high seas on the basis of a few cases holding that swim-
mers and water-skiers are not maritime would appear to be
stretching these cases too far.
D'Aleman v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.8° is a strong
case in favor of extending admiralty jurisdiction to cover air-
planes. In flight from Puerto Rico to New York a plane devel-
oped engine trouble, and one engine had to be feathered. The
suit was brought by one passenger's representative who claimed
that the feathering of the engine sent the decedent into a state
of shock that resulted in his death four days later. This claim
was heard by a judge in admiralty and dismissed on its merit.
81
The court of appeals sustained admiralty jurisdiction, saying
that the expression "on the high seas" should be capable of ex-
pansion to "under" or "over," as scientific advances change the
methods of travel. The law would indeed be static if a passenger
on a ship was protected by the Act, and another passenger in the
identical location three thousand feet above in a plane was not
protected. Nor should the plane have to crash into the sea to
bring the death within the act, any more than a ship should have
to sink.82 Such a holding is reminiscent of the real property
maxim, cujus est solum, ejus est usgue ad coeum. One might be
able to argue that this result is distinguishable on the ground
that the libelant should not be able to disclaim admiralty juris-
diction once he has invoked it. However, such is not what the
case held. Since recovery was denied on the merits, it cannot be
explained away on the theory that the courts are disposed to
allow claimants to recover even if traditional jurisdictional con-
cepts are stretched thereby. If followed by other courts, the
D'Aleman doctrine will eliminate the need to empanel a jury in
a plane crash case to decide whether the injury occurred in the
air or on the water. Such a procedure was employed where an
80. 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958).
81. Ibid. Another claim for failure to provide proper care was heard by a
jury and disposed of under Virginia law.
82. D'Aleman v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 259 F2d 493, 495 (2d Cir.
1958).
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action was brought under the Alabama Wrongful Death Act
after a crash several miles off the Alabama coast.8 3 Whether the
crash occurred in the air or on the water was thought to be
determinative of whether admiralty jurisdiction would extend,
or whether the action would have to be tried under Alabama
law. The judge treated the jury verdict as merely advisory but
followed their advice and dismissed the claim under the state
act, stating that Alabama's sovereignty did not extend that far
beyond its shores. The action was then transferred to the ad-
miralty docket.
The Third Circuit has taken a further, consistent step in recog-
nizing admiralty jurisdiction over airplanes in Weinstein v.
Eastern Airlines, Iw. 14 On a scheduled flight between Boston
and Philadelphia a plane took off from Logan Airport and
crashed into Boston harbor within one marine league from shore.
A libel in personam was filed in admiralty in the United States
District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania. There was no
precedent for holding that an action for death within the marine
league limit was in admiralty, but here there was good incentive
on the plaintiff's part to try for such a holding, since Massachu-
setts law would have limited recovery to $30,000.85 Under the
traditional conflict of laws doctrine, a Pennsylvania court also
would have to apply this limitation. The court of appeals sus-
tained admiralty jurisdiction, remarking that "the critical factor
in determining whether a tort claim comes within the broad
statutory grant of admiralty jurisdiction is the situs of the tort,
i.e., the place where it happened."8 6 On the question of maritime
situs as a sufficient criterion for sustaining admiralty jurisdic-
tion in tort, the court extensively reviewed the decisions since
The Plymouth and came to the conclusion that McGuire, involv-
ing a swimmer who struck a submerged object, was the only
case where a simple maritime locale had not been sufficient to
sustain jurisdiction in admiralty. The weight of authority indi-
cated that locality alone determines whether or not a tort claim
is within the admiralty jurisdiction. At the time the Constitution
was framed and for a century and a half thereafter, ships of
various kinds were the only means of transportation and com-
83. Sokolowska v. National Airlines, Inc., 5 Av. Cas. 18, 213 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
84. 316 F2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. dended, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
85. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. cI. 229 § 2 (Supp. 1962).
86. Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758, 761 (3d Cir. 1963),
cert. dended, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
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merce on or across navigable waters. When an aircraft crashed
into navigable waters, the dangers to persons and property are
much the same as those arising out of the sinking of a ship or
a collision between two vessels. "There can be nothing more mari-
time than the sea .... 87 The court pointed out, as indeed it
had to, that since the crash occurred within the one marine league
limit, the High Seas Act gave no cause of action for death. Even
though the action must be based on the state wrongful death
act88 instead of the High Seas Act, the admiralty jurisdiction
was held to exist.
If, as it has been held, a tort claim arising out of the crash
of an airplane beyond the one marine league line is within
the jurisdiction of admiralty, then a fortiori a crash of an
aircraft just short of that line but still within the navigable
waters is within that jurisdiction as well. To hold otherwise
would be to impose an illogical and irrational distinction
on the operation of the broad grant of admiralty jurisdic-
tion extended by the Constitution and implemented by 28
U.S.C.A. § 1333.89
This was the first case to involve an airplane crash in navigable
waters within the limit. Therefore, it is a more convincing hold-
ing that airplane crashes are cognizable in admiralty than are
holdings under the High Seas Act in which there can be no
choice in what court the action is brought. It is not clear what
effect admiralty jurisdiction may have in death cases, since the
action must be based on a state statute, and the Supreme Court
has held that "when admiralty adopts a State's right of action
for wrongful death, it must enforce the right as an integrated
whole, with whatever conditions and limitations the creating
State attached." 90 Nevertheless, the -Weinstein decision was re-
ceived with great joy in the camps of the admiralty claimants'
bar.91
87. Id. at 763, quoting in part from Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F2d 60, 65
n.6 (5th Cir. 1961).
88. PA. SAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1601-04 (1953). This act has no limitation on
amount of recovery for wrongful death.
89. Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F2d 758, 765 (3d Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
90. The Tungus v. Skovggard, 358 U.S. 588, 592 (1959).
91. The NACCA Law Journal commented that the Weinstein court had
spurned a static view of admiralty jurisdiction and had been properly respon-
sive to the vitality of modem commercial life, by holding that "new conditions
of commerce give rise to enlarged conceptions of maritime jurisdiction. This
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If admiralty actions in airplane crash cases are dependent on
state death acts where the crash is within the one marine league
limit, and if the case is not connected with the shipping industry
in the traditional sense, and further if the gravamen of the
claim is the same as in a land crash, that is negligence in manu-
facture and operation, then admiralty jurisdiction in cases like
Weintein serves no functional purpose other than perhaps in the
conflict of laws area. Such could well be an adequate justification
for the extension. The logic of the Weinstein rationale is that if
admiralty jurisdiction is to be asserted over plane crashes on the
high seas, the mere fortuity of a crash within or without the
limit should not be determinative of the applicable law. How-
ever, the case is illogical because it did not go far enough to
consider the fact that any airplane can escape even this admiralty
jurisdiction by flying a little bit further and crashing on land.
In such a case the choice of the law must be determined by the
civil forum.
D. Workmen's Compensation
In King. v. Pan Am. WorkS Airways92 a flight service super-
visor for Pan American was killed in the course of his employ-
ment when the plane in which he was riding crashed somewhere
between San Francisco and Hawaii. His representative filed a
libel in the United States District Court, Northern District of
California, alleging recovery under the Death on the High Seas
Act. His employer had already filed an application before the
California Industrial Accident Commission, and a workmen's
compensation award had been made.93 The district court granted
a motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff on the
grounds that the California Workmen's Compensation Act was
an exclusive remedy.94 On appeal the Ninth Circuit sustained
commendable approach recalls one of the great canons of constitutional judg-
ment expressed by Justice Brandeis: 'If we would guide by the light of reason,
we must let our minds be bold."' 30 NACCA L.J. 324, 326 (1964), quoting in
part from Mr. Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
The writer indicated his high opinion of Weinstein when he stated that if it
"did no more than lift from the backs of such embattled crew members the
albatross of the harsh contributory negligence doctrine (served by 19th century
laissez faire out of a medieval concept of cause), it would impressively justify
itself as a fine functional decision." 30 NACCA L.J. 324, 326 (1964).
92. 270 F2d 355 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 928 (1959).
93. Claim No. SF 183-024, Industrial Accident Commission of the State of
California (March 31, 1958).
94. WFns's Aim. CA n. Lm...oR CODE § 3600. This is a common provision in
the state workmen's compensation acts. See 2 LARsoN, WoRaXEN-'s COMPENSA-
ToN LAw § 86.50 and App. A, Table 6 (1952).
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this decision saying that the High Seas Act was intended to be
pre-emptive of state death acts, but there was no evidence of
congressional intent to make the statute pre-emptive of state
workmen's compensation acts. Further, the court held that there
was nothing in the "twilight zone" cases to prevent the exclu-
siveness of workmen's compensation in this instance. 95 From the
standpoint of admiralty jurisdiction this case is indeed a poor
one. It is incontrovertible that workmen's compensation acts
provide a different standard of proof and are designed to apply
irrespective of fault. Further, it is arguable that Congress was
aware of state workmen's compensation acts when it passed the
Death on the High Seas Act and did not intend to pre-empt the
area. However, Congress did not manifest this intent, and now
when the first case arises, workmen's compensation with its
long-outdated award schedules has almost become a defense
against adequate recovery. A court should be expected to exer-
cise a little responsibility when it reads congressional intent into
the statute. Instead, the court distinguished the Higa and D'Ale-
mz cases because they were not workmen's compensation cases,
a weak rationale indeed when the interpretation of the limits of
the constitutional admiralty jurisdiction were involved. The
effort to drag in the "twilight zone" cases through the back door
is a poor judicial stunt. Those cases are concerned with workers
on the fringe of the maritime nexus, on board ships in port or
working around docks, and should not be determinative where
deaths occur 3,000 miles out on the high seas.9 6 The reasoning
here seems to be of the same type announced in WiHbU Boat
Go. v. Fiema's Fund Is. Co., 97 where the Supreme Court
applied state law merely because no admiralty case had come
up on that particular point. In King precedent clearly showed'
that such crashes were within admiralty jurisdiction, and the
court should not have diminished the existing admiralty juris-
diction in such a fashion. The interest of fifty separate states in
exclusively asserting their own workmen's compensation acts
on the high seas should not be sufficient to deny recovery under
a federal death act based on admiralty jurisdiction.
95. The court relied on Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942),
and Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272 (1959).
96. See, e.g., Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962); Grant-
Smith, Porter Co. v. Rhode, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jen-
sen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
97. 348 U.S. 310 (1935).
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E. Contracts and Implied Tam'anties
One of the most interesting areas in which admiralty juris-
diction has been invoked over airplanes is that of contracts, or
more specifically that protean device, the implied warranty. The
basic controversy which classically has determined admiralty
jurisdiction over contracts had its origins in DeLovio V. Boit,
98
where marine insurance contracts were held to be within the
admiralty jurisdiction even though entered into on land. The
court said that the words "admiralty" and "maritime" jurisdic-
tion include jurisdiction of all things done upon and relating to
the sea, or, in other words, all transactions and proceedings rela-
tive to commerce and navigation, and to damages or injuries upon
the sea.99 This view was followed in subsequent decisions involv-
ing insurance contracts,100 but unfortunately later courts have
not applied this broad concept of admiralty and maritime juris-
diction. Thus, there exists the ridiculous situation that a contract
to repair a ship is held to be maritime, 1O1 while a contract to
build a ship is not.102 Such casuistry in dealing with ship con-
tracts raises a question of what the courts would do when dealing
with contracts for the building of an airplane, and here a real
paradox is to be found.
Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.Y'1 could well
turn out to be a harbinger of revolution in the law of maritime
contracts at least where aviation is concerned. A balloon was air-
borne some eighteen miles out to sea when gas began to leak out.
The warning system, which was supposed to ring a bell in the
event of leakage, failed to warn the men aboard in time, and both
were killed when the balloon plunged into the sea. A libel in
personam was filed against Goodyear, who had manufactured
the balloon, and against Edwards, who had manufactured the
warning device. The court denied the respondents' objection that
there was no survivorship claim in admiralty, noting that absent
such a cause of action under the Death on the High Seas Act,
an action under state statutes would exist, and such could be
found both under the laws of Connecticut and Delaware.10 4
98. 7 Fed. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
99. Ibid.
100. Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1 (1871).
101. New Bedford Dry Dock Co. v. Purdy, 258 U.S. 96 (1922).
102. People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. 693 (U.S. 1857). Gilmore and
Black have pronounced this decision "clearly wrong." See Gmuioan & BLAck,
THE LAW OF ADMnRALTY 27-28 (1957).
103. 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y 1964)
104. Id. at 452, citing Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354, 373 (1959).
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Further, the court held that the Death on the High Seas Act was
not limited to claims arising from negligence alone but encom-
passed breaches of warranty, "for a breach of warranty is as
much a breach of duty as is a negligent act." 10 5 A similar claim
for breach of warranty had been asserted in the Weintein case
and had been denied because the plane traveled mostly over land.
For this reason the court thought that there was not a sufficient
maritime connection. The WTeintein court specifically left open
the question whether there could be a sufficient maritime connec-
tion in the case of an airplane that flew primarily over water.106
The court in Motgomery seized upon this lacuna, saying that
the dirigible involved here came within the exception. "Its manu-
facture was for the Navy, and it was intended for use primarily
over water. Given these facts, it was more likely than not that a
crash would take place over water, and so within the admiralty
jurisdiction."1 0 7 Having thus found the balloon to be cognizable
in admiralty, the court set out to distinguish the cases holding
that a contract to build a ship is not in and of itself a maritime
contract.
Despite this principle, recent developments in the Supreme
Court indicate a broadening of the scope of implied warran-
ties in admiralty cases. In Italia Societa, etc. v. Oregon
Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 . . . (1961), the Court held
that a stevedore company breached its implied warranty of
workmanlike service by supplying a defective rope even
though there was a finding that the stevedore had not been
negligent. A kind of strict liability in warranty was imposed
on the stevedore .... On several occasions, the absolute
liability imposed under an implied warranty of workmanlike
service has been analogized by the Supreme Court to the
supplier's warranty of the fitness of his product. . .. It is
then only a short step to directly recognized [that] implied
warranties cover an airship intended for flight over water
and sold to the United States Navy.10 8
If this neat syllogism were not enough, the court took a liberal
view with regard to the nature of an implied warranty when it
105. Id. at 453.
106. Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758, 766 (3d Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
107. Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447, 453
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
108. Id. at 453-54.
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said that "the recent trend in personal injury and death cases
based on warranty has been to treat the action as one in the na-
ture of tort, ignoring contract considerations. 10 9 Of course,
admiralty clearly has jurisdiction if considered a tort since "the
sole test for recognition of a maritime tort is whether the injury
occurred over navigable waters." 110
This case, if followed, promises to shake up some precedents
in the long lethargic area of ship contracts. If taken in conjunc-
tion with Weinstein, it will provide a means of recovery in plane
crashes over navigable waters that is uniform throughout the
nation. Moreover, this would appear to be a justified result since
it places responsibility for death and injury on the manufacturer
and the owner of the craft, where it can be most easily prevented.
The body of substantive law built up over the centuries to be
applicable to ships on navigable waters is not generally one which
would be helpful when an airplane is substituted for a ship. The
slow nature of ship commerce has led to a gentlemanly, almost
romantic, handling of commercial matters and to special rules
of collision that are particularly inapposite to fast-moving craft.
The one peculiar admiralty feature that would appear to be
functional when applied to airplanes is the law of salvage. In
that situation the differences between ships and planes have been
reduced to the common denominator of disaster and ruin, and
the long experience of admiralty in these matters would serve
the interests of all parties.
Personal injury and death are another story. Here, there is
logic in having one body of law apply to crashes, if for no other
reason than to escape the maze of choice of law problems. Ad-
miralty jurisdiction over the Death on the High Seas Act is now
settled, and nothing short of congressional enactment is likely
to change it. Since these death claims must be brought in ad-
miralty, there is a good argument for the proposition that injury
claims arising from a crash on the high seas are also in admi-
ralty. If Congress has assumed that such crashes are within
the admiralty jurisdiction, there is no reason why a claim for
injury should not be also.
There is the further problem of devising a test for determina-
tion of admiralty jurisdiction over injury and death claims when
109. Id. at 454.
110. Id. at 454. However, the court did dismiss the case against Edwards
who had made the warning device on grounds of privity, holding that there was
no need to hold a manufacturer of a component part liable since adequate pro-
tection was provided by casting the principal manufacturer in liability.
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the plane does not crash. As arbitrary as it may seem, no better
criterion can be found than to let a maritime nexus be determina-
tive of jurisdiction when the plane crashes on the water, and
otherwise to require a maritime connection to bring an airplane
within the admiralty. This test would exclude suits in admiralty
for injuries and deaths occurring in aircraft above the high seas
since there is no connection with the sea below, and the injury
could not be said to have anything to do with the sea. Such a
test, however, is not without its problems. The most common
situation which would strain the rule is where the plane explodes
over the coast line and falls partly onto land and partly into the
ocean. Another possibility is the over-shooting by a plane of an
airport runway which is close to navigable water. In these cases
it might be better for a court to use the maritime connection test.
Of course, it may be difficult for some judges to recognize this
distinction, as is evident from the D'Aleman case, especially
where the death or injury occurs above the water rather than
while floating on its surface or beneath it in a submarine.
The arbitrariness of this criterion is necessitated by the manner
in which the courts came to have admiralty jurisdiction in the
first place. So long as the law stands as it is with the Death on
the High Seas Act, it is indeed hard to say that a judge should
bury his altruism in such cases in favor of some abstract theory
of jurisdiction. While the manner of drafting of that piece of
legislation was indeed an unfortunate circumstance, its language
cannot in good conscience be reduced to mere tautology. Perhaps
then, the way to look at airplanes over the high seas is to take
the view that while there are problems in this approach, they are
nothing like the problems that would exist if things were left
to the laws of the several states.
[Vol. 18
21
Crenshaw: Airplanes in the Admiralty Jurisdiction: A Short History
Published by Scholar Commons,
